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INTRODUCTION

In 2004, the Criminal Law Edit, Alignment and Reform
(CLEAR) Commission was created. 6
The purpose of the
Commission was to create a process for review and reform of
Illinois criminal and sentencing laws in order to make these laws
more readable, understandable, and just. 7 One of the more
important concepts adopted by CLEAR was the creation of a
permanent, on-going oversight body charged with the review of
criminal and sentencing laws.
The creation of a Criminal Law Review Commission and a
Sentencing Law Review Commission would address the need for a
de-politicized, holistic approach to criminal and sentencing law
change and reform.
Moreover, the proposed criminal and
sentencing commission is formatted consistently with other
existing Illinois review commissions such as the Commission on
Government Forecasting and Accountability or the Compensation
Review Board.8
The proposed criminal law commission also
incorporates components of commissions in other states charged
with substantive revisions of existing law. 9
California,
Connecticut, and Oregon have law review commissions to ensure
that their state statutes are understandable and free of defects. 10
Likewise, the Illinois sentencing commission proposal includes
elements of independent sentencing commissions in other states."
Alabama, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, and Pennsylvania have
6. CLEAR Initiative, http://www.clearinitiative.org (last visited Nov. 21,
2007).

7. Id.
8. See 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/3A-1 (2007) (Illinois Commission on

Government Forecasting and Accountability); 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1
(2007) (Illinois Compensation Review Board).
9. California Law Review Commission, http://www.clrc.ca.gov
(last visited Nov. 21, 2007); Connecticut Law Review Commission,
http://www.cga.ct.gov/lrc (last visited Nov. 21, 2007); Oregon Law Commission,
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/olc (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
10. Id.
11. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, http://www.msgc.
state.mn.us (last visited Nov. 21, 2007); Missouri Sentencing Advisory
Commission, http://www.mosac.mo.gov/index.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2007);
Kansas Sentencing Commission, http://www.accesskansas.org/ksc
(last visited Nov. 21,
2007); Alabama
Sentencing Commission,
http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov (last visited Nov. 21, 2007); The
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, http://pcs.la.psu.edu (last visited
Nov. 21, 2007).
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established sentencing review commissions to allow
12
autonomous deliberation concerning sentencing reform.

I.

for

THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL AND SENTENCING
LAW REVIEW COMMISSIONS

To ensure that Illinois criminal and sentencing laws remain
consistent and understandable, a Criminal Law Review
Commission and a Sentencing Law Review Commission should be
enacted to serve as an on-going process to review, update, and
revise Illinois criminal and sentencing laws.
Both of these
commissions address needs that arise in the Illinois criminal
13
justice system.
The commissions would establish a holistic approach to
criminal and sentencing law reform. Unlike all other laws,
criminal and sentencing laws deal with one's freedom and the
taking of one's life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. 14 The need
for these commissions arises from the obligation to equally apply
criminal justice law and policies assuring Constitutional
protections embodied in the Bill of Rights are afforded to all
citizens.15 The taking of Constitutional freedoms triggers the need
for a greater degree of objective, detached, and de-politicized
review and revision of existing criminal laws. 16
These
independent commissions would ensure that laws are not enacted
without deep consideration in an effort to avoid knee-jerk
reactions to anectodal problems or "crimes of the week."' 7
Both commissions would also serve the purposes of the
Criminal Code and the Code of Corrections. 8 A Criminal Law
12. Id.
13. See Vera Institute of Justice and Pew Charitable Trusts Multi-State
Meeting, Recent National Trends: What Drives Sentencing Reform? (Nov. 4-6,
2007) (noting a 335 percent increase in nationwide incarcerated population
from 1980 to 2005 and an 871 percent increase in nationwide corrections
spending from 1980 to 2005).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15.

U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.

16. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (ruling that a law
that criminalizes sexual intimacy between same-sex couples violated a
person's right to liberty under Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (ruling that a flag
desecration statute infringes on First Amendment freedoms of expression).
17. Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 432 (2000) ("By setting
sentencing policy for all crimes (or at least, all felonies), guidelines systems
could ... avoid piecemeal reforms in response to the current 'crime of the
week"').
18. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-2 (2007):
The provisions of this Code shall be construed in accordance with the
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Review Commission would be charged with collecting data and
reviewing current law to "prescribe penalties which are
proportionate to the seriousness of offenses."'19 Members of the
Criminal Law Review Commission would have the experience and
expertise necessary to "prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment
of persons accused or convicted of offenses," 20 which pervades the
current enacting process.
Moreover, because Constitutional
freedoms are at stake, a criminal law commission would ensure
that laws adequately define "the act and mental state that
constitute the offense." 21 Thus, a criminal commission would
modify or eliminate statutes that are unconstitutionally vague or
fail to give sufficient notice to the public as to what acts are
prohibited. 22
In addition to ensuring that laws are
understandable, a criminal commission would modify or eliminate
laws that are constitutionally overbroad, infringe on basic
23
freedoms, or are redundant.
Likewise, a Sentencing Law Review Commission would be
dedicated to collecting and analyzing data that reflects the current
general purposes hereof, to: (a) Forbid and prevent the commission of
offenses; (b) Define adequately the act and mental state which
constitute each offense, and limit the condemnation of conduct as
criminal when it is without fault; (c) Prescribe penalties which are
proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which permit
recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual
offenders; (d) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatmet of persons
accused or convicted of offenses;
See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-2:

The purposes of this Code of Corrections are to: (a) prescribe sanctions
proportionate to the seriousness of the offenses and permit the
recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual
offenders; (b) forbid and prevent the commission of offenses; (c) prevent
arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons adjudicated offenders or
delinquents; and (d) restore offenders to useful citizenship.
19. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-2.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (providing that a
statute that required citizens to provide "credible and reliable" identification
when requested by a peace officer was void-for-vagueness because statute
failed to set forth a standard for determining "credible and reliable");
Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
"[a] statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of
ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes"); see also John F.
Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity and Other Uncertaintyin American
Criminal Law, 801 DENVER U. L. REV. 241-344 (2002).
23. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding that a law that
criminalizes sexual intimacy between same-sex couples violated a person's
right to liberty under Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420 (holding that flag desecration statute infringes on
First Amendment freedoms of expression). See generally John F. Decker,
Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53-107 (2004)
(discussing the overbreadth doctrine).
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status of the Illinois sentencing system to fulfill the prescription
that sentencing laws are "proportionate to the seriousness of the
offenses and permit the recognition of differences in rehabilitation
possibilities among individual offenders." 24 In addition to barring
cruel and unusual punishment, the Illinois Constitution states
that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the
offender to useful citizenship. '25
To ensure proportionate
sanctions and to prevent oppressive treatment, Illinois appellate
courts have struck down sentences found to be excessive 26 or
disproportionate. 27 To address these problems, a Sentencing Law
Review Commission would set forth sentencing guidelines that
would prevent disputes from arising and reduce the need for
expending unnecessary judicial resources from an already taxed
criminal justice system. 28
Thus, a Sentencing Law Review
Commission would allow for a systematic data-driven approach
towards sentencing laws to "prevent arbitrary or oppressive
treatment of persons adjudicated offenders or delinquents," and to
"restore offenders to useful citizenship. 2 9

24. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-2.
25. ILL CONST. art. I, § 11.
26. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 243 Ill. App. 3d 170, 176 612 N.E.2d 14, 19
(1st Dist. 1993) (holding that a statutory 45-year sentence was excessive, the
Court reduced sentence to 30 years because at time of the offense defendant
was 20 years old and lacked any prior criminal history... ); People v. Short, 66
Ill. App. 3d 172, 176-77, 383 N.E.2d 723, 727 (5th Dist. 1978) (holding that the
trial court abused its discretion by imposing incarceration because of
defendants' inability to make immediate financial restitution to victims).
27. See, e.g., People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 837 N.E.2d 901 (2005)
(holding that "a sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is so
cruel, degrading, or disproportionate to the offense that the sentence shocks
the moral sense of the community" or if the sentence "is greater than the
sentence for an offense with identical elements").
28. Stanford Criminal Justice Center, THE CRIMINAL RECORD Spring 2007
Newsletter,
1, available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/
programs/scjclnewsletter/07/crimlawjfall2007.pdf. As of June 2006 there were
over 2.2 millions Americans incarcerated in the nation's prisons and jails.
This constitutes a 500% increase in the number of people incarcerated in the
United States since 1972. Id.
29. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-2.
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EXISTING ILLINOIS REVIEW COMMISSIONS

To investigate and address current and future statutory
problems, the Illinois legislature created several other review
commissions such as the Compensation Review Board, the
Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability, and a
Violent Crimes Advisory Commission.3 0
Because these
commissions deal with laws that may be susceptible to political
pressures, their creation allows for a de-politicized decision
making process involving objective analysis and review.3 1
The Compensation Review Act created the Compensation
Review Board ("Board"). 32 The Board consists of twelve members 33
and is charged with determining compensation for members of the
"General Assembly, judges .... state's
attorneys .... elected
constitutional officers of State government, and certain appointed
officers of State government." 34 The Board looks at several
objective factors ranging from the position's skill and time
requirements, opportunities for other earned income, cost of living,
the value of the service performed in comparable states, and the
level of public interest in the service. 35 A report of the Board's
30. See, e.g., 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (2007) (Illinois Compensation
Review Board); 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/3A-1 (Illinois Commission on

Government Forecasting and Accountability); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 240/5
(Illinois Violent Crimes Advisory Commission).
31. See 2002
Report
Of The Compensation
Review
Board,
http://www.prairienet.org/ija/comprev.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2007) (stating
that
[iun past Reports ...we proposed that the General Assembly amend the
Compensation Review Act to require our reports to be filed in oddnumbered years instead of even-numbered years. We made this request
because in even-numbered years our Reports are filed just months
before statewide elections. This unfortunate timing injects politics into
the process and prevents the dispassionate, objective and nonpartisan
review of salary recommendations that was intended by the
[Compensation Review] Act.)
32. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1.
33. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2. The Compensation Review Board consists
of: three members appointed by the President of the Senate, three members
appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate, three members appointed by
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and three members appointed by
the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.
34. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4 (2007).
35. Id.
In determining the compensation for each office, the Compensation
Review Board shall consider the following factors:
(a) the skill required,
(b) the time required,
(c) the opportunity for other earned income,
(d) the value of public services as performed in comparable states,
(e) the value of such services as performed in the private sector in
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findings and recommendations is made public and public hearings
are then conducted. 36 Once the Board files its report with the
General Assembly, the General Assembly may "disapprove the
report of the Board in whole, or reduce it in whole proportionately,
within 30 session days after each house of the legislature next
37
convenes after the report is filed."
Like the Compensation Review Act, the Legislative
Commission Reorganization Act of 1984 created the Commission
on Government Forecasting and Accountability ("CGFA").38 The
CGFA consists of 12 members 39 and is charged with the
"continuing study of the laws and practices pertaining to pensions
and related retirement and disability benefits," to "evaluate
existing laws and practices," and to "review and make
recommendations on proposed changes to those laws and
practices."40 Moreover, the CGFA provides impact notes showing
41
how proposed legislation would affect the public pension system.
Because issues of compensation and pension benefits are so
politically loaded, these commissions allow for a depoliticized
decision making process as a result of objective analysis and
review. 42 Ultimately, recommendations for changes are made
and
outside the traditional political process allowing for reasoned
43
criteria.
objective
on
based
making
contemplative decision
In addition to investigating pension laws, the legislature
created the Violent Crimes Advisory Commission to study the

Illinois and comparable states based on the responsibility and discretion
required in the office,
(f) the average consumer prices commonly known as the cost of living,
(g) the overall compensation presently received by the public officials
and all other benefits received,
(h) the interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the
State to meet those costs, and
(i) such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally
or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of such
compensation.
Id.
36. Id.
37. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/5(b) (2007).
38. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/3A-1.

39. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/1-5 (2007). The CGFA consists of 12 members:
three members appointed by the President of the Senate, three members
appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate, three members appointed by
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and three members appointed by
the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. Id.
40. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/3A-l(b).
41. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/3A-1(c).

42. Supra note 32.
43. Id.; see also Frase, supra note 18, at 432 (offering that "the use of an
independent, appointed commission [is] designed to insulate sentencing policy
decisions from short-term political pressures").
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laws, practices, agencies, and organizations that affect violent
crime victims.

44

Under the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act,

the Commission has the following responsibilities:
[t]o promote and conduct studies, research, analysis and
investigation of matters affecting the interests of crime victims;...
[t]o... recommend legislation to develop and improve policies which
promote the recognition of the legitimate rights, needs and interests
of crime victims;...

[t]o ...

serve as a clearinghouse for public

information relating to crime victims' problems and programs;...
[t]o... coordinate, monitor and evaluate the activities of programs
operating under this Act;... [t]o ... make any necessary outreach

efforts to encourage the development and maintenance of services
throughout the State, with special attention to the regions and
neighborhoods with the greatest need for victim assistance
services;... [t]o ... perform other activities, in cooperation with the
Attorney General, which the Advisory Commission considers useful
to the furtherance of the stated legislative intent;... [... and] make
45

an annual report to the General Assembly.

The commission consists of 18 members and includes
representatives of the Illinois legislature, agencies that assist
victims of violent crime, and members of the public that have
experience and expertise in dealing with the victims of violent
46
crime.
A criminal law and sentencing law commission would be
analogous to existing Illinois review commissions in several ways.
Review commissions ensure that commission members have the
47
expertise and experience to make informed recommendations.

44. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 240/5.
45. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 240/5(a).
46. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 240/4 (2007).

[T]he Attorney General, or his or her designee who shall serve as
Chairperson; the Illinois Secretary of State or his or her designee; the
Chief Justice of the Court of Claims or his or her designee; the Director
of Children and Family Services; 2 members of the House of
Representatives, 1 to be appointed by the Speaker of the House and 1 to
be appointed by the Minority Leader of the House; 2 members of the
Senate, 1 to be appointed by the President of the Senate and 1 to be
appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate; and the following to be
appointed by the Attorney General: 1 police officer; 1 State's Attorney
from a county in Illinois; 1 health services professional possessing
experience and expertise in dealing with the victims of violent crime;
one person who is employed as an administrator at a public or private
institution of higher education; one person who is enrolled as a student
at a public or private institution of higher education; and 5 members of
the public, one of whom shall be a senior citizen age 60 or over,
possessing experience and expertise in dealing with victims of violent
crime, including experience with victims of domestic and sexual
violence.
Id.
47. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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For example, members of the Violent Crimes Advisory
Commission, who have worked with victims of violent crimes, are
able to make recommendations that effectively address victims'
needs. 48
Likewise, a criminal commission and a sentencing
commission would consist of members that represent a broad
cross-section of participants in the criminal system. Moreover,
because so many different parties have different conflicting
interests as to how the Illinois criminal justice system should be
run, a criminal law and sentencing law commission would conduct
independent and objective review of Illinois criminal law. 49 Thus,
the decision making process would be driven by members with
expertise in the criminal justice system instead of a process driven
by outside political pressures. 50
48. Letter from Jennifer Kuhn, Chair, Violent Crime Advisory Commission,
2006 Letter to the Illinois Legislature (Nov. 2006), available at
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/victims/2006 lettertojlegislature.pdf.
The Violent Crime Advisory Commission recommends funding for state
non-profit agencies that provide one or more of the following services:
"[c]oordinate volunteers to work with criminal justice agencies to
provide direct victim services or to establish community support;
Provide assistance to victims of violent crime and their families in
obtaining assistance through other official or community resources;
Provide elderly victims of crime with services appropriate to their
special needs; Provide transportation and/or household assistance to
those victims participating in the criminal justice process; Provide
victims of domestic and sexual violence and sexual harassment with
services appropriate to their special needs; Provide courthouse reception
and guidance, including explanation of unfamiliar procedures and
bilingual information; Provide in-person or telephone hot-line assistance
to victims; Provide special counseling facilities and rehabilitation
services to victims; Provide other services as the Commission shall deem
appropriate to further the purposes of this Act; Provide public education
on crime and crime victims; Provide training and sensitization for
persons who work with victims of crime, and Provide special counseling
facilities and rehabilitation services for child victims of sex offenses.
Id.
49. See generally, American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section
Standards: Sentencing Standard 18-4.1(a) Basic responsibilities of the agency
performing the intermediate function, http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/
standards/sentencingjoc.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007). The section
provides that the sentencing commission:
should be the information center for all elements of the criminal justice
system. The agency should collect, analyze and disseminate information
on the nature and effects of sentences imposed and carried out. The
agency should develop means to monitor, evaluate, and predict patterns
of sentencing, including levels of severity of sentences imposed and
relative use of each type of sanction. Information gathered by the agency
is necessary to the legislature's performance of the legislative function,
to the agency's performance of the intermediate function, and to the
courts' performance of the judicial function.
Id.
50. See generally, American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section
Standards: Sentencing Standard 18-4.2(a) Establishment of sentencing
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Illinois review commissions are also responsible for collecting
data and conducting objective analysis. 51 For example, laws that
affect compensation and benefits are especially susceptible to
political influence. 52 Thus, by objectively reviewing data relating
to increases in the cost of living, Illinois' financial ability to
compensate public officials, and how Illinois compares to other
states in compensating public officials, the Compensation Review
Board can determine the best course of action on compensation
laws. 53 Likewise, criminal and sentencing laws require a depoliticized approach. A sentencing commission would gather data
such as the length of stay for varying offenses, the number and
types of sentences imposed, as well as data showing how
sentencing laws impact prison populations. 54 By analyzing data, a
sentencing commission can make objectively informed decisions
about the current state of sentencing as well as identify trends or
patterns in order to make predictions about the future of
sentencing.' 5 An analysis of criminal law data would allow a
criminal law commission to identify inconsistencies in substantive
offenses, statutory language that is redundant or difficult to
understand, and laws that are inappropriately placed within the

commission,
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/sentencing-toc.html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
The legislature should provide that the commission be composed of lay
persons and persons with varying perspectives and experience within
the criminal justice system and with sentencing processes, including at
least one representative of the judiciary, prosecuting authorities,
defense bar, and correctional and probation agencies. In composing the
commission, consideration should be given to the community's ethnic
and gender diversity.
Id.
51. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (Illinois Compensation Review Board); 25
ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/3A-1 (Illinois Commission on Government Forecasting
and Accountability); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 240/5 (Illinois Violent Crimes
Advisory Commission).
52. 2002 Report Of The Compensation Review Board, supranote 32.
53. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.

54. See, e.g., Kansas Sentencing Commission, supra note 12, at Goals and
Objectives (providing the Commission receives reports "for all persons who are
sentenced for felony crimes"). Reports are maintained in a computer database
"from which the Commission staff can then monitor, evaluate, and analyze
sentences imposed pursuant to the sentencing guidelines." Based on this data,
the Commission can also "[d]etermine the number of guidelines sentences
imposed, the characteristics of offenders and the offenses committed, the
number and types of departure sentences, and the overall conformity of
sentences to the sentencing guidelines..." as well as "[a]nalyze the overall
distribution of guidelines sentences by race, ethnic origin, gender, age,
education level and geographic location to determine whether the sentencing
guidelines have reduced or eliminated the biases which were found to be
inherent in the pre-guidelines sentencing system.").
55. Id.
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Illinois Criminal Code. 56
In addition to gathering and analyzing data, Illinois review
commissions also recommend changes to the legislature. 57 For
example, the Commission on Government Forecasting and
Accountability ("CGFA") informs the legislature about pension
laws that are causing confusion, the problems that have resulted
from particular laws, and proposed modifications to existing law
that may resolve problems. 58 Likewise, a criminal law commission
would inform the legislature of potential unconstitutional or
inconsistent statutes as well as statutes that are duplicative or
difficult to understand.5 9 A sentencing law commission would
report to the legislature the commission's projections as to
correctional resource needs and whether the current or
recommended provisions were furthering the purposes of the Code
of Corrections and Criminal Code. 60 Moreover, like the CGFA,
56. CLEAR Initiative, Benefits of Less Complex Illinois Criminal Code,
http://www.clearinitiative.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
The Code will be more accessible to laypeople trying to obey the law.
Judges and lawyers will find the Code easier to understand and apply.
The reform will eliminate disputes over interpretation of the Code that
can reduce costly retrials, court delays and mistakes. The size of the
Code will be reduced significantly, and indexing will be improved.
Policy makers will more easily understand the implications of
amendments proposed in the future. The new Code will limit the
opportunity for lengthy and expensive appeals due to confusion with the
existing Code.
Id.
57. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/3A-1; see also Commission on Government
Forecasting and Accountability, Commission Profile, http://www.ilga.gov/
commission/cgfa2006/CommissionProfile.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2007)
(stating "[tihe Commission evaluates existing laws and practices and makes
recommendations on proposed changes to the Illinois Pension Code and
annually issues a Report on the Financial Condition of Illinois Public Pension
Systems" to the Illinois General Assembly).
58. 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/3A-1; Commission on Government Forecasting
and Accountability, Commission Profile, supra note 58.
59. CLEAR
Initiative,
Senate
Bill
150
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.clearinitiative.org/documents/SB150factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov.
21, 2007).
Criminal Law Review Commission will review legislation that proposes
changes to Illinois criminal laws. For each proposed statute the
Commission will ask: Is the statute constitutional? Is the statute
duplicative of or inconsistent with existing law? Does the statute include
a mental state? Is the statute placed in an appropriate place within the
state statutes.
Id.
60. See American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section Standards:
Sentencing Standard 18-4.2 Establishment of sentencing commission, supra
note 51 (noting the sentencing commission should be responsible for "periodic
reports to he [sic] legislature and the public regarding the commission's data
gathering and research, and reports responsive to any particular queries posed
by the legislature to the commission;" as well as "periodic recommendations to
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which is charged with submitting impact statements related to
proposed legislation affecting pension laws, a criminal and
sentencing law commission would submit impact statements
showing how proposed legislation would affect criminal and
61
sentencing systems.
III. ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW COMMISSION
A. Purpose of a Criminal Law Review Commission
After an 18-month study of Illinois' Criminal Code, the
CLEAR Commission identified and remedied various problems
that were a result of a countless number of changes to the
Criminal Code. 62 To ensure that future changes to the Criminal
Code are incorporated in a consistent and efficient manner, the
CLEAR Commission also recommended the creation of an on-going
permanent Criminal Law Review Commission. 63 To preserve the
CLEAR Commission's changes and maintain a useful, accessible,
and comprehensible Criminal Code, a Criminal Law Review
Commission would conduct an ongoing review of proposed criminal
legislation. 64 The Criminal Law Review Commission would be an
independent commission and would act as a gate-keeping body so
that proposed changes to the Criminal Code go through a depoliticized and thorough review process. 65
After review of
proposed legislation, the criminal law commission would submit
recommendations to the General Assembly.66 This added level of
review ensures that the legislature makes informed decisions and
that the Criminal Code remains uniform and adheres to
67
fundamental drafting principles.

the legislature regarding changes in the criminal code or to the rule making
authority regarding changes in the rules of criminal procedure").
61. See, e.g., 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/2 (2007) (noting that "[t}he Commission
on Government Forecasting and Accountability.. shall prepare a written
pension system impact note in relation to any bill introduced in either house of
the General Assembly which proposes to amend, revise, or add to any
provision of the Illinois Pension Code or the State Pension Funds Continuing
Appropriation Act").
62. CLEAR Initiative, Senate Bill 150 Fact Sheet, supra note 60.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. Id.

66. Id.
67. Id.
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B. Law Review Commissions in Other States
Other states have created law review commissions to ensure
that substantive laws remain consistent, understandable, and
constitutional. 68 For example, Connecticut, Oregon, and California
have created independent commissions to review substantive law
in order to discover defects and to discover laws that may be
outdated. 69 These commissions generally consist of members
appointed by the General Assembly and the governor.70 Moreover,
these commissions are charged with receiving and considering
suggestions from a variety of sources, such as the American Law
Institute, bar associations, judges, lawyers, public officials, and
members of the public. 71 To ensure that a thoughtful reform
process takes place, each commission identifies the defects with
the law, gathers data regarding the law at issue, proposes the best
possible reform solution, and provides the legislature with a
thorough report detailing the commission's assessment and
72
recommendation.

68. California Law Review Commission, http://www.clrc.ca.gov (last visited
May 22, 2008); Connecticut Law Review Commission, http://www.cga.ct.gov/lrc

Oregon
Law
Commission,
May
22,
2008);
(last
visited
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/olc (last visited May 22, 2008).
69. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
Commissioners,
Commission,
Law
Revision
70. Connecticut
http://www.cga.ct.gov/lrc/commissioners.htm (last visited May 22, 2008);
Oregon Law Commission, Commission Members, http://www.willamette.edul
wucl/olc/staff (last visited May 22, 2008); California Law Revision
Commission,
the
Law
Revision
Persnonnel
of
Commission,
http://www.clrc.ca.govfMbg-personnel.html (last visited May 22, 2008); D.C.
Sentencing and Criminal Code Revision Commission http://sentencing.dc.gov
(follow "commission members" hyperlink) (last visited May 22, 2008).
71. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2-87(1) (West 2007) (quoting the
statute "Receive, consider and prepare comments and recommendations on
proposed changes in the law recommended by the American Law Institute, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, bar
associations, judges, lawyers, public officials, or other learned bodies or
qualified individuals"); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173.338(1)(a),(b) (West 2007)
(stating "[t]he specific subject areas to be part of the law revision program of
the Oregon Law Commission include . . . [p]roposed changes in the law

recommended by the American Law Institute, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, any bar association or other learned
bodies"); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8289(b) (West 2007) (stating "[t]he commission
shall .. .(b) Receive and consider proposed changes in the law recommended
by the American Law Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, any bar association or other learned bodies").
72. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2-87(2)(7) (stating "[t]he commission shall
.(2) Recommend, from time to time, such changes in the law as it deems
necessary to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and
to bring the law of this state, civil and criminal, into harmony with modern
conditions; . . .(7) Submit an annual report to the general assembly."). See,
e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173.342(1) (explaining that "[t]he Oregon Law
Commission shall file a report at each regular session of the Legislative
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The Connecticut Law Review Commission was created under
The Connecticut
Connecticut's Legislative Department.7 3
commission consists of 15 members 74 and is responsible for
receiving, considering and preparing recommendations on
proposed legislation.7 5 To identify laws that need review, the
commission looks at recommendations made by the American Law
Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, bar associations, judges, lawyers, public officials, or
The commission recommends
other qualified individuals.7 6
changes to current law in order to eliminate "antiquated and
inequitable" laws and to bring the current law into "harmony with
modern conditions." 77 For example, the Connecticut legislature
asked the Connecticut commission to review current Connecticut
laws concerning the right to a jury trial for misdemeanors. 78 In its
analysis, the Connecticut commission reviewed Federal and State
Constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to a jury trial as
By
well as decisions of the Connecticut Superior Court. 79
reviewing and analyzing the issue, the commission was able to
ensure that accurate information was gathered to better inform
Thus, the
the legislature on the best course of action.80
Connecticut legislature was in a position to make a well-informed
Assembly that shall contain recommendations for statutory and
administrative changes and a calendar of topics selected by the commission for
study"); CAL. GOV'T CODE Ann. § 8289(a) (explaining that "[tihe commission
shall . . . (a) Examine the common law and statutes of the state and judicial
decisions for the purpose of discovering defects and anachronisms in the law
and recommending needed reforms").
73. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2-85 (West 2007).
74. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2-86 (West 2007). The first six members are
as follows: the president pro tempore of the Senate; the minority leader of the
Senate; the speaker of the House of Representatives or his or her designee; the
minority leader of the House of Representatives or his or her designee; the cochairperson of the joint standing committee on judiciary or his or her designee;
and a ranking member of the joint standing committee on judiciary or his or
her designee. The following is a list of the remaining nine members: two
members appointed by the president pro tempore; two members appointed by
the speaker of the house; and five members appointed by the governor..Three
of the governor's appointees must be members of the Connecticut bar, one
must be a superior or supreme court judge, and one must be a law school
faculty member.; see also Connecticut Law Revision Commission,
Commissioners, http://www.cga.ct.govllrc/commissioners.htm. (including a list
of the commissioners).
75. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2-87(1).

76. Id.
77. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2-87(2).

78. Connecticut Law Revision Commission,
Report on Connecticut Right to a Jury Trial for Misdemeanors, Jan. 20, 1998,
http://www.cga.ct.govlrcrecommendations/l1999Recommendations/JuryTrialR
pt.htm.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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decision based on an objective analysis by an independent expert
commission.8 1
Like the Connecticut Law Review Commission, the Oregon
Law Commission was created in 1997 to conduct a "continuous
substantive law revision program."8 2 The Oregon commission
consists of thirteen commissioners.8 3 The commission enabling
law designated "specific "subject areas" that are part of the
commission's law revision program.8 4
Thus, the Oregon
commission looks at the common law, statutes, and recent judicial
decisions in order to discover "defects and anachronisms" in the
law that are in need of reform.8 5 Like the Connecticut commission,
the Oregon commission also looks at proposed changes submitted
by various legal bodies such as the American Law Institute, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
and bar associations.8 6 The Oregon commission is also notified of
experiences where a judge or lawyer has had difficulty in applying
the law or when a member of the general public has had difficulty
in seeking a legal remedy.8 7 For example, the commission's
website provides the commission's contact information and directs
visitors to contact the commission regarding an issue.8 8 The
commission reviews the issue and the relevant laws that should be
studied and gives priority to "private law issues that affect large
numbers of Oregonians and public law issues that are within the
scope of an existing state agency."8 9
The commission also
considers the "resource demands of a particular issue, [t]he length
of time required for study and development of proposed legislation,
[a]nd the probability of approval of the proposed legislation by the
81. Id.
82. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173.315(1).
83. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173.315(2)(a)-(g) (The Oregon commission
consists of two members appointed by the President of the Senate, with at
least one being a Senator at the time of appointment; two members appointed
by the Speaker of the House, with at least one being a Representative at the
time of appointment; deans of Oregon's accredited law schools or their
designee; three members appointed by the Board of Governors of the Oregon
State Bar; the Attorney General or his or her designee; the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court or the Chief Justice's designee; and one person appointed by
the Governor); see also Oregon Law Commission, Commission Members
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/olc/staff (last visited Mar. 10, 2007) (listing
the commissioners and staff).
84. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173.338(1).
85. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173.338(1)(a).
86. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173.338(1)(b).
87. Oregon Law Commission, Law Reform Process, Sources of Law Reform
Projects, http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/olc/process (last visited Mar. 10,
2007).
88. Id.
89. Oregon Law Commission, Law Reform Process, The Program
Committee, http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/olc/process (last visited Mar. 10,
2007).
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legislature and the governor." 90
Once the commission selects a law in need of reform, a work
group is formed to identify defects in the law. 91 The work group
prepares a report discussing the issue and how the proposed
legislation addresses the identified problem. 92 The report is then
communicated to the public, allowing interested citizens to
communicate their ideas and concerns relating to the proposed
legislation. 93 The work group's report is also submitted to the full
commission for review and approval. 94 If the commission approves
the proposed legislation, the report is submitted to the
legislature. 95 At this point, "[blecause the Commission's law
reform process includes thoughtfully choosing law reform projects,
carefully drafting proposed legislation and communicating with
and educating stakeholders, the expectation is that bills
recommended by the Commission will be viewed favorably by
legislators and ultimately passed into law."96 By taking these
steps, the commission ensures a holistic approach is taken before
the legislature considers proposed bills. 97 Moreover, because the
commission works independently, its assessment is shielded from
political pressures and allows for an unbiased source of
98
information.
Like Connecticut and Oregon, California created the
California Law Review Commission in 1953 in order to serve as a
continuing substantive review of California's common law and
statutes. 99 The Commission consists of nine members' 0 0 and is

90. Id.
91. Oregon Law Commission, Law Reform Process, Formation of Work
Group, http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/olc/process (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
92. Oregon Law Commission, Law Reform Process, Formation of Work
Group - Approaching the Issue, http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/olc/process
(last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
93. Oregon Law Commission, Law Reform Process, Communication and
Education, http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/olc/process (last visited Nov. 21,
2007).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Oregon Law Commission, Law Reform Process, The Legislature,
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/olc/process (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8280 (West 2007); see also California Law Revision
Commission, History and Purpose, http://www.clrc.ca.gov/Mbg-history.html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
100. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8281 (West 2007) (stating that the commission
consists of one member of the Senate appointed by the Committee on Rules,
one member of the Assembly appointed by the Speaker, and seven members
appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.); see
also California Law Revision Commission, Personnel of the Law Revision
Commission, http://www.clrc.ca.gov/Mbg-personnel.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2008) (including a list of commission members and officers).
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charged with (1) examining common law and statutes in order to
discover "defects and anachronisms" 10 1 in the laws; (2) receive and
consider proposed changes from the American Law Institute, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
bar associations; 10 2 and (3) receive and consider suggestions from
10 3
judges, lawyers, public officials, and members of the public.
The California commission is also charged with making
recommendations in order to "modify or eliminate antiquated and
inequitable rules of law."14 For example, in 2005, the California
commission was directed by the legislature to conduct a study and
recommend proposed legislation to reorganize statutes relating to
the control of deadly weapons.1 0 5 The directive was a response to
the Governor's statement that "a reorganization of the current
[firearm] laws should be undertaken to ensure that statutes that
impose criminal penalties are easily understandable."'' 0 6 To
achieve this goal, the commission had several objectives: (1) reduce
the length and complexity of current sections, 0 7 (2) eliminate
108
unnecessary cross-references to other sections of the statute,
make use of common definitions, 10 9 (3) organize provisions so that
similar provisions are in close proximity of each other,11 0 and (4)
Thus, by setting forth and
eliminate duplicative provisions.'
adhering to these objectives, proposed changes to California laws
are driven by objective, detached analysis and not anecdotal
Rather, the California
evidence and reactionary politics. 112
commission ensures that laws remain uniform, constitutional, and

101.
102.
103.
104.

CAL. GOV'T
CAL. GOV'T
CAL. GOV'T
CAL. GOV'T

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

§
§
§
§

8289(a).
8289(b).
8289(c).
8289(d).

2007-5,
105. California Law Revision Commission, Memorandum
Nonsubstantive Reorganization of Deadly Weapon Statutes: Scope and
at
available
18,
2007),
Study
1
(Jan.
of
Methodology
http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/2007MM07-05.pdf.
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 5.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id. at 7.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. California Law Revision Commission, History and Purpose,
http://www.clrc.ca.gov[Mbg-history.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
The Commission studies the law in order to discover defects and
anachronisms and recommends legislation to make needed reforms.
The Commission assists the Legislature in keeping the law up to date
by: [i]ntensively studying complex and sometimes controversial subjects,
[i]dentifying major policy questions for legislative attention, [glathering
the views of interested persons and organizations, [and] [d]rafting
recommended legislation for legislative consideration.
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113

adherent to sound drafting principles.
In 2006 the District of Columbia, established the Sentencing
and Criminal Code Revision Commission, authorizing its existing
sentencing commission to analyze and review criminal laws in
addition to sentencing laws.11 4 The commission consists of 15
voting members and 5 non-voting members. 115 In reviewing
sentencing laws, the commission is charged with analyzing data
113. Id.
114. D.C. CODE § 3-101.01 (2007).
115. D.C. CODE § 3-102(a) (2007).
(1) The voting members of the Commission shall consist of the following:
(A) Three judges of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia,
appointed by the Chief Judge of the Superior Court;
(B) Repealed;
(C) The United States Attorney for the District of Columbia or his or her
designee;
(D) The Director of the D.C. Public Defender Service or his or her
designee;
(E) The Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia or his or her
designee;
(F) The Director of the District of Columbia Offender Supervision,
Defender and Court Services Agency or his or her designee, or, until
that agency is certified and assumes its duties, the Pretrial Services,
Defense Services, Parole, Adult Probation and Offender Supervision
Trustee or his or her designee;
(G) Two members of the District of Columbia Bar, one who specializes in
the private practice of criminal defense in the District of Columbia, and
one who does not specialize in the practice of criminal law, appointed by
the Chief Judge of the Superior Court in consultation with the President
of the District of Columbia Bar;
(H) A professional from an established organization devoted to research
and analysis of sentencing issues and policies, appointed by the Chief
Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia;
(1) Two citizens of the District of Columbia who are not attorneys, one of
whom is nominated by the Mayor subject to confirmation by the Council,
and the other who is appointed by the Council; and
(J) Three professionals from established organizations, to include
institutions of higher education, devoted to the research and analysis of
criminal justice issues, appointed by the Council.
(2) The non-voting members of the Commission shall consist of the
following:
(A) The Director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections
or his or her designee;
(B) The Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department or his or her
designee;
(C) The Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons or his or her
designee;
(D) The Chairperson of the United States Parole Commission or his or
her designee; and
(E) One member of the Council, appointed by the Chairman of the
Council.
Id.; see also D.C. Sentencing and Criminal Code Revision Commission,
available at http://sentencing.dc.gov (follow "commission members" hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
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and making recommendations in order to establish a "fair and
rational sentencing system." 116 Moreover, the commission ensures
that sentences shall: "reflect the seriousness of the offense and the
criminal history of the offender; provide for just punishment;
afford adequate deterrence to potential future criminal conduct of
the offender and others; provide the offender with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, and other
correctional treatment; and provide for use of intermediate
117
sanctions in appropriate cases."
In its review of the sentencing system, the commission found
disparities in sentences attributable to legitimate sentencing
factors as well as differences in sentencing philosophies amongst
the courts.118 To address disparity problems the commission
sought to establish a "normative method" of creating prison ranges
and sentencing options based on historical data." 9 Thus, the
commission created a set of sentencing guidelines so that
"similarly situated offenders ... receive similar sentences for
committing the same crime in essentially the same way and that
offenders receive different sentences where either the nature of
the offense or the history of the offender is different. 1 20 By
adhering to basic fairness principles, the sentencing guidelines
help prevent sentencing laws that result from knee-jerk reactions
121
to societal problems.
To address problems within the criminal justice system, the
commission is also charged with:
(1) revis[ing] the language of criminal statutes to be clear and
consistent; (2) ...organiz[ing] existing criminal statutes in a logical
order; (3) assess[ing] whether criminal penalties (including fines) for
felonies are proportionate to the seriousness of the offense, and, as
necessary, revise the penalties so they are proportionate; (4)
propos[ing] a rational system for classifying misdemeanor criminal
statutes, determin[ing] appropriate levels of penalties for such
classes; and classify[ing] misdemeanor criminal statutes in the
appropriate classes; (5) identify[ing] any crimes defined in common
law that should be codified, and propos[ing] recommended language
for codification, as appropriate; (6) identify[ing] criminal statutes
116. D.C. Sentencing and Criminal Code Revision Commission,
http://sentencing.dc.gov (follow "About SDDC" link) (last visited Nov. 21,
2007).
117. D.C. CODE § 3-101.01b).
118. D.C. SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL CODE REVISION COMMISSION, 2006
PRACTICE MANUAL, THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
VOLUNTARY SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR PLEAS AND VERDICTS ENTERED ON

AND
AFTER
JUNE
14,
2004,
at
1-1,
available
at
http://sentencing.dc.gov/acs/frames.asp?doc=/acs/lib/acs/2006-practice-manual

.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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that have been held to be unconstitutional; [and] (7) propos[ing]
such other122 amendments as the Commission believes are
necessary[.]
C. Illinois Criminal Law Review Commission:
Purpose,Members, and Function
The purpose of the Criminal Law Review Commission would
be to make the criminal laws of Illinois easier to understand,
access, apply, and interpret. 123 The law review commission would
consist of twelve members: three members appointed by the
President of the Senate, three members appointed by the Minority
Leader of the Senate, three members appointed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, and three members appointed by
the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. 124 Moreover,
the law review commission would promote obedience to the rule of
law as well as reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of the
criminal justice system by eliminating disputes relating to
criminal laws that result in retrials, delays, and mistakes in the
process. 125 The law review commission would be charged with
reviewing and evaluating all proposed legislation filed in the
Illinois General Assembly relating to criminal offenses. 126 To meet
this charge, the criminal law commission would determine:
whether the legislative proposal was constitutional, duplicative, or
inconsistent with existing law. 27 The criminal commission would
also ensure that the legislative proposal contains an appropriate
mental state and is placed in the correct location within the
Illinois Criminal Code. 128 The criminal law commission would
report to the legislature annually or when the commission finds it
129
necessary to submit results of a completed analysis.

122. D.C. CODE § 3-101.01(a).

123. CLEAR Initiative, Senate Bill 150 Fact Sheet, supra note 60.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

128. Id.
129. Id.
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IV. ILLINOIS SENTENCING LAW REVIEW COMMISSION

A. Purpose of having a Sentencing Law Review Commission
Since the establishment of the Illinois Code of Corrections
("Code") in 1973, an untold number of changes have been made
over the ensuing years. 130 As a result, organizational issues,
inconsistencies, and redundancies within the Code have
developed. 131 Countless judicial, prosecutorial, and defense hours
and resources have been wasted resolving disputes arising from
132
conflicts in Illinois sentencing laws.
To maintain sentencing laws that are understandable and
consistent, the CLEAR Commission suggested a process to review,
update, and revise sentencing laws.
This process would be
incorporated into an Illinois Sentencing Law Review Commission.
A sentencing commission that reviews sentencing laws ensures
that the analysis will be conducted by examiners familiar with and
experienced in the Illinois criminal justice system. 33 A sentencing
commission's core function would be to gather sentencing system
data. 34 Based on empirical data, a sentencing commission could
then analyze causes of sentencing disparity, develop projections on
the impact of changes to sentencing and the corrections process,
35
and submit its findings and recommendations to the legislature.'
Further, a sentencing commission also ensures that consistent
standards of objective review and analysis are followed. Because
of the inherent difficulties in developing and monitoring a
sentencing review process and the need for detached, objective
130. CLEAR

Initiative,

Senate

Bill

100

Fact

Sheet,

available at
(last

http://www.clearinitiative.org/documents/SB10FactSheet52207.pdf
visited Nov. 21, 2007).

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section Standards:
Sentencing, supra note 51.
134. See generally, American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section
Standards: Sentencing: Standard 18-4.2(b) Establishment of sentencing
commission,
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/sentencing-toc.html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2007) (stating "[t]he legislature should designate the
commission's responsibilities to include . . . ongoing data gathering and

research relating to sentencing policies and practices, including studies
regarding compliance with the provisions promulgated by the commission,
rates of disparities in sentencing, and the past and projected impact of the
provisions promulgated by the commission").
135. Id.
The legislature should designate the commission's responsibilities to
include . . . periodic reports to the legislature and the public regarding

the commission's data gathering and research, and reports responsive to
any particular queries posed by the legislature to the commission ...
[and] periodic recommendations to the legislature regarding changes in
the criminal code or to the rule making authority regarding changes in
the rules of criminal procedure.
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analysis of sentencing laws, a sentencing commission should be
established. 136
An Illinois sentencing commission could help resolve many of
the sentencing issues facing Illinois today, and could protect
against such issues in the future.13 7 Many of the problems facing
sentencing in Illinois and throughout the country derive from the
"tough on crime" policies of the 1980s and 1990s, which included
rigid mandatory minimum sentences, three-strikes legislation, and
truth-in-sentencing laws. 138 These were passed in state and
federal jurisdictions without information on the long-term impact
139
on criminal justice systems.
136. Stanford Criminal Justice Center, Contemporary Sentencing Reform in
California:A Report to the Little Hoover Commission 1 (Aug. 4, 2006).
It is sound policy to create an independent agency, drawing on
professional policy expertise as well as the perspectives of
representatives from various parts of state government, whose mandate
is to collect and analyze sentencing and corrections data, to develop
statewide sentencing and corrections policies, and to distribute
sentencing discretion appropriately and evenly throughout the criminal
justice system. All of the relevant parties have their own, often
conflicting, ideas on how best to resolve California's sentencing and
corrections crisis. The only sensible solution is to delegate the
responsibility of conducting an objective analysis of these issues to an
independent expert agency capable of addressing them.
Id.
137. CLEAR Initiative, Senate Bill 100 Fact Sheet, supra note 131.
138. David H. Norris & Thomas Peters, Fiscal Responsibility and Criminal
Sentencing in Illinois: The Time for Change is Now, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
317, 331 (Winter 1993).
The new "tough-on-crime" law was a mixture of the House and Senate
proposals. Public Act 80-1099 contained most of the structural changes
advanced in H.B. 1500, including (1) determinate sentencing for all
felonies; (2) abolition of early release parole; (3) day-for-day good time
credits; (4) controls on judicial discretion at sentencing; and, (5) controls
on corrections' discretion in determining release. It also included some
Class X proposals advanced by the Senate, such as: (1) the creation of a
new category, Class X, and its mandatory penitentiary sentence; (2) an
increase in the number of felonies with a mandatory penitentiary
sentence; (3) the implementation of longer sentences for most felonies;
and, (4) the imposition of various other techniques aimed at increasing
penitentiary sentences.
139. Vera Institute of Justice and Pew Charitable Trusts Multi-State
Meeting, supra note 14 and accompanying text; see Stanford Criminal Justice
Center, supra note 137, at 1.
There is now growing agreement among practitioners, policymakers,
and academics that California's post-1976 sentencing structure has
contributed to serious problems that no one anticipated in 1976 - a
correctional system plagued by egregious overcrowding, unsafe
conditions for officers and inmates, racial imbalances in prison
populations, high recidivism, a troubled parole revocation system,
increasing expenditures, a lack of systematic data collection, and an
incoherent sentencing structure. This new consensus now recognizes
that it is good public policy for California to create a sentencing data
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Because of the costs of incarceration and the thousands of
people recidivating each year, many states are taking another look
at their sentencing policies and practices to determine their intent
and effectiveness by analyzing the public safety outcomes and
costs versus benefits of current sentencing structures. 140 One of
the ways this is being done is through the empanelling of
sentencing commissions.' 4 ' Ultimately, the work of sentencing
commissions can lead to more equitable sentencing practices that
reduce gender and racial disparities in the system, and can help
insure that good policy and better public safety preempts political
expedience.142
To effectively address sentencing law issues, several
responsibilities should be assigned to an Illinois sentencing
commission. 43 According to the American Bar Association, a
sentencing commission should be charged with the "promulgation
and periodic revision of presumptive sentences and other
provisions to guide sentencing discretion."'144
To make
knowledgeable recommendations, the sentencing commission
should also maintain an ongoing process of gathering objective
data and research into sentencing laws. 145 As part of this process,
the sentencing commission should determine whether commission
and policy commission as a new independent agency, drawing on
professional policy expertise as well as the perspectives of
representatives from various parts of state government.
Id.
140. See Vera Institute of Justice and Pew Charitable Trusts Multi-State
Meeting, supra note 14, (noting a 871% increase in nationwide corrections
spending from 1980 to 2005).
141. E.g., Stanford Criminal Justice Center, supranote 137, at 6.
The experience of many states has shown that sentencing commissions
are emerging as the most successful modern governmental institution to
prevent or cure the kind of correctional crisis that California now faces.
A majority of states adopting the commission model did so as a direct
response to the problems associated with purely discretionary and
indeterminate sentencing and parole systems.
Id.
142. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, http://www.msgc.state.
mn.us/msgc5/faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
The sentencing guidelines embody the goals of the criminal justice
system as determined by the citizens of the state through their elected
representatives. This system promotes uniform and proportional
sentences for convicted felons and helps to ensure that sentencing
decisions are not influenced by factors such as race, gender, or the
exercise of constitutional rights by the defendant. The guidelines serve
as a model for the criminal justice system as a whole to aspire to, as well
as provide a standard to measure how well the system is working.
Id.
143. American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section Standards, supra
note 61.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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recommended laws are followed, the current and projected impact
of the commission's recommended laws, and the levels of disparity
among criminal sentences. 146
Moreover, the sentencing
commission should periodically report to the legislature regarding
147
its findings as well as address any legislative questions.
B. Sentencing Commissions in Other States
Sentencing commissions have been put into place in as many
as twenty-six other states. 48 The CLEAR Sentencing Commission
proposal is a result, in part of an analysis of these other
commissions. 149 Despite some variation, each commission adheres
to several core principles: (1) having members with the requisite
expertise in order to collect sentencing data, evaluate sentencing
structures, and recommend sentencing policies; (2) having a
sentencing guidelines structure that is either mandatory or
voluntary; (3) making projections to correctional resource needs;
and (4) establishing a review process that is outside of traditional
political processes. 50 According to the Stanford Criminal Justice
Center, sentencing commissions "do not embrace any particular
political agenda" nor are they "typically affiliated with a particular
political party or philosophy."' 5'
Moreover, sentencing
commissions do not make decisions in individual cases, but rather
they "help states make intelligent decisions about who should go to
prison, and for how long," and who should be diverted from
prison. 152 Commissions should do so "on the basis of empirical
53
analysis, not political ideology."'

146. Id.

147. American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section Standards:
Sentencing, supranote 61.
148. See Barb Tombs, Presentation at the Vera Institute of Justice and Pew
Charitable Trusts Multi-State Meeting, Strategies for Creating a Sentencing
Framework (Nov. 4-6 2007) (noting that the states with sentencing
commissions are: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington).
149. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, http://www.msgc.state.
mn.us (last visited Nov. 21, 2007); Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission,
http://www.mosac.mo.gov/index.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2007); Kansas
Sentencing Commission, http://www.accesskansas.org/ksc (last visited Nov.
21, 2007); Alabama Sentencing Commission, http://sentencingcommission.
alacourt.gov (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
150. Stanford Criminal Justice Center, supra note 137, at 6.
151. Stanford Criminal Justice Center, THE CRIMINAL RECORD Spring 2007
Newsletter, at 7. (http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/
programs/scjc/newsletter/07/crimlaw-spring2007.pdf

2007).
152. Id.
153. Id.

(last visited Nov. 21,
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The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission was
created by the legislature in 1978154 and consists of eleven
members. 155 The goals of the commission are to "assure public
safety,"
"promote
uniformity
in
sentencing,"
"promote
proportionality in sentencing," "provide truth and certainty in
sentencing," and to "coordinate sentencing practices with
correctional resources." 156 To meet these goals, the commission
established "Sentencing Guidelines," a system intended to
"promote uniform and proportional sentences for convicted felons"
and "to ensure that sentencing decisions are not influenced by
factors such as race, gender, or the exercise of constitutional rights
by the defendant." 15 7 The Sentencing Guidelines are presented in
"Sentencing Guideline Grids," where the vertical axis represents
the severity of the offense and the horizontal axis represents the
offender's criminal history. 158 For felonies, the offense severity is
classified into eleven levels ranging from "severity level I" (lowest)
to "severity level XI" (highest).159 A separate grid exists for sex
offenses and classifies the offense severity into eight levels,
ranging from "A" (lowest) to "H" (highest).160 Criminal history is
represented by a computed index value that is determined by: "(1)
prior felony record; (2) custody status at the time of the offense; (3)
prior misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor record; and (4) prior
juvenile record for young adult felons."'161 The presumptive

154. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, supra note 143.
155. MINN. STAT. § 244.09 (2007).

The Sentencing Guidelines Commission shall consist of the following: (1)
the chief justice of the Supreme Court or a designee; (2) one judge of the

Court of Appeals, appointed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court;
(3) one district court judge appointed by the chief justice of the Supreme
Court; (4) one public defender appointed by the governor upon
recommendation of the state public defender; (5) one county attorney
appointed by the governor upon recommendation of the board of
directors of the Minnesota County Attorneys Association; (6) the
commissioner of corrections or a designee; (7) one peace officer as
defined in section 626.84 appointed by the governor; (8) one probation
officer or parole officer appointed by the governor; and (9) three public
members appointed by the governor, one of whom shall be a victim of a
crime defined as a felony.
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Commission Members and
Staff, http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5/commission.htm (last visited Nov.
21, 2007).
156. Minnesota
Sentencing
Guidelines
Commission
Practitioner
Supplement, at 4, http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5/training.htm (last
visited Nov. 21, 2007).
157. Id.

158. Id. at 5.
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 4.
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sentence is found at the intersection where the offense severity
row intersects with the criminal history column. 162 The court still
maintains discretion over the sentencing period and may depart
from the Sentencing Guideline recommendation if substantial and
compelling factors exist. 163 If a court departs from the
recommended sentence, the court must then state its basis for the
164
departure.
The Minnesota commission also monitors sentencing practices
by maintaining data on all offenders sentenced under the
guidelines as well as all departures from the presumed
sentence. 65 Sentencing guidelines worksheets are submitted by
probation officers and contain the offender's demographic
information, a description of the offense, the offender's criminal
history, and the presumptive sentence.1 66 The collection of this
data assists the legislature in making informed decisions when
amending sentencing laws. 167 For example, the commission's 2007
drug report informed the legislature of (1) the number of drug
offenders imprisoned, (2) that Minnesota's drug laws were harsher
than those of neighboring states, (3) that there was a high
departure rate from the presumptive sentence, and (4) that
Minnesota courts considered the presumptive sentences for drug
offenses as too severe. 166
Moreover, the report provided
recommendations for proposed changes to the drug-crime
sentencing structure, namely, the re-ranking of first-degree and
1 69
second-degree drug offenses and the expansion of drug courts.
As a result of Minnesota's review process, changes to sentencing
laws are ultimately based on empirical analysis rather than

162. Id. at 20.
163. See Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5/faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2007) (defining "departure").
164. Id.
165. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Sentencing Practices,
Annual Summary Statistics for Felony Offenders Sentenced in 2005, at 3,
available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/data-reports/rep05.DOC
(last
visited Nov. 21, 2007).
166. Id.
167. Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission, Report to the
Legislature, Jan., 1999, at 1, http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/data-reports/
leg1999.pdf.
168. See Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Updated Report on
Drug
Offender
Sentencing
Issues,
Jan.
31,
2007,
at
1,
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/data-reports/msgc-drug-update07.doc
(last
visited Nov. 21, 2007) (stating that "[a] sentencing guidelines system provides
the legislation with a structure for determining and maintaining a rational
sentencing policy. Through the development of the sentencing guidelines, the
legislature determines what will be the goals and purposes of the state's
sentencing system").
169. Id. at 18-19.
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anecdotal evidence or knee-jerk reactions.170
Similar to Minnesota's legislative initiative, the Missouri
legislature created the Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission
in 1994.171 This commission was dormant between 1998 and
In 2004, the commission published a system of
2003.172
The
recommended sentences that was enacted in 2005.173
Missouri commission consists of eleven members 17 4 and its goals
are to "promote public safety, fairness and efficiency in sentencing
and corrections and to promote the wisest use of the state's
resources."'175 To meet its charge of establishing a "system of
recommended sentences,"'176 the commission created a set of
"Sentencing Recommendations." 177 The recommended sentence is
based on four factors:
"(a) the nature and severity of each offense; (b) the record of prior
offenses by the offender; (c) the data gathered by the commission
showing the duration and nature of sentences imposed for each

crime; and (d) the resources of the department of corrections and
78
other authorities to carry out the punishments that are imposed."'
Like Minnesota, the Sentencing Recommendations are in the
form of a grid where the vertical axis represents the offense's
severity and the horizontal axis represents the offender's prior
criminal history.179 The presumptive recommended sentence is
defined where the offense's severity and the offender's prior

170. Id. at 1.
171. Mo. REV. STAT § 558.019 (2007).
172. Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission, Purpose and Goals,
http://www.mosac.mo.gov/purposegoals.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).

173. Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission, Report on Recommended
Sentencing

2005,

at

4,

http://www.mosac.mo.gov/Documents/final

report2lJune 2005.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
174. Mo. REV. STAT § 558.019(6)(1). The speaker of the house, the president

pro tem of the senate, and the director of the department of corrections each
appoint one member. Six members are appointed by the governor and are
chosen from the following groups: the public defender commission, private
citizens, private members of the Missouri Bar, the board of probation and
parole, and a prosecutor. The Missouri Supreme Court also appoints two
members, one from a metropolitan area and one from a rural area. Missouri
Sentencing Advisory Commission, Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission
Members and Staff, http://www.mosac.mo.gov/membersstaff.htm (last visited
Nov. 21, 2007).
175. Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission, Report on Recommended
Sentencing 2005, supra note 174 at 4.
176. Mo. REV. STAT § 558.019(6)(3).
177. Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission,
Report on Recommended Sentencing 2005, supra note 174 at 11,
http://www.mosac.mo.gov/reportsstudies.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
178. Mo. REV. STAT § 558.019(6)(3)(a)-(d).
179. Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission, Report on Recommended
Sentencing 2005, supra note 174, at 22.
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criminal history intersect.1 8 0 The Sentencing Recommendations
are only advisory, thus the court still retains discretion to lower or
to exceed the sentence recommended set forth by the
commission.18 1
Moreover, the commission requires probation
officers to give courts and attorneys Sentencing Assessment
Reports.18 2 These reports analyze the offender's risk factors,
suggests alternative community-based sanctions or prison-based
18 3
programs, and recommends sentences for the offender.
According to an October 2007 commission report, Missouri's
use of recommended sentences had reduced prison population,
184
putting a stop to an on-going increase in prison population.
Since 2005, in which recommended sentences were implemented
state-wide, 82% of sentences imposed were within the range of
recommended sentences.18 5 In October 2005, the prison population
was at an all-time high of 30,650.186
As of July 2007, the
population had decreased to 29,960.187 According to Michael A.
Wolff, Supreme Court judge and chair of the Sentencing Advisory
Commission, "[t]he study confirms statistically what we intuitively
believed - that public safety is enhanced when judges statewide
follow the recommended sentences" and that cooperative efforts
from various state agencies "are creating an effective and coherent
188
system of sentencing ...... 1.
Kansas' sentencing commission was established in 1989 to
implement and enforce the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines.1 8 9 The
Kansas Sentencing Commission is comprised of 17 members. 190

180. Id.
181. Mo. REV. STAT § 558.019(7).
182. Sentencing Advisory Commission, News Release: Report Shows
Missouri's Use of Recommended Sentences Reduces Recidivism Rates, Prison
Population,
http://www.mosac.mo.gov/Documents/recommended%20sentences%2Olead%20
to%20dropping%20prison%20populations-recidivism%2010-15-07%20c.pdf
(last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
183. Id.
184. Missouri Sentencing Commission, Recommended Sentencing, Biennial
Report 2007, supranote 174, at 2
185. Id. at 7.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Id.
188. Sentencing Advisory Commission, News Release: Report Shows
Missouri's Use of Recommended Sentences Reduces Recidivism Rates, Prison
Population, supra note 183.
189. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101 (2007).
190. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9102 (2007).
The Kansas sentencing commission shall consist of 17 members, as
follows:
(1) The chief justice of the supreme court or the chief justice's designee;
(2) two district court judges appointed by the chief justice of the supreme
court;
(3) the attorney general or the attorney general's designee;
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The commission is charged with developing a sentencing model
that shall provide a "mechanism for linking justice and corrections
policies" and will reduce sentence disparity. 191 The commission is
also responsible for training judges, states attorneys, and other
personnel involved in the sentencing system.1 92 In addition, the
commission produces inmate population projections, analyzes
problems in the criminal justice system, and makes
recommendations for improvements in criminal law. 193
To monitor Kansas' sentencing system the commission
maintains a database that contains presentence investigation
19 4
reports (PSI) for all persons who are given felony sentences.
The commission uses the database to determine (1) the number of
times a court has imposed a guideline sentence, (2) the offender's
characteristics and offense committed, and (3) the number of times
courts have departed from a recommended sentence and reasons
for departure. 195 The commission is also able to assess the
effectiveness of the guidelines in reducing disparity based on race,
ethnic origin, gender, age, education level, and geographic

(4) one public defender appointed by the governor;
(5) one private defense counsel appointed by the governor;
(6) one county attorney or district attorney appointed by the governor;
(7) the secretary of corrections or the secretary's designee;
(8) the chairperson of the Kansas parole board or such chairperson's
designee;
(9) two members of the general public, at least one of whom shall be a
member of a racial minority group, appointed by the governor;
(10) a director of a community corrections program appointed by the
governor; and
(11) a court services officer appointed by the chief justice of the supreme
court. Not more than three members of the commission appointed by the
governor shall be of the same political party.
(b) In addition to the members appointed pursuant to subsection (a),
four members of the legislature shall serve as voting members of the
commission. Such members shall be appointed as follows: One shall be
appointed by the president of the senate, one shall be appointed by the
minority leader of the senate, one shall be appointed by the speaker of
the house of representatives and one shall be appointed by the minority
leader of the house of representatives.
(c) The governor shall appoint a chairperson from the two district court
judges appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court or the chief
justice of the supreme court. The members of the commission appointed
pursuant to subsection (a) shall elect any additional officers from among
its members necessary to discharge its duties.
Id. See also Kansas Sentencing Commission, Commission Members,
http://www.accesskansas.org/ksc/commission.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2007)
(providing details about the commission).
191. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101(b).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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location. 96 By collecting this data, the commission is able to make
an objective and reasoned analysis about Kansas' sentencing
system. 197 Thus, sentencing changes are derived and supported by
collected data that accurately reflect the state of the sentencing
system.198

Additionally, in order to project prison populations and the
impact of proposed legislation on those populations, the
commission utilizes a software modeling system that mimics the
flow of offenders through Kansas' prison and parole populations. 199
A result of accurate data gathering and the utilization of advanced
technology, the commission is able to promptly submit fiscal
200
impact and correctional resource statements to the legislature.
Moreover, to achieve its goal of educating and training those that
have an active role in the sentencing system, the commission
conducts training seminars and publishes a Sentencing Guidelines
Desk Reference Manual. 20 1 Together, the seminars and manual
help promote consistency in criminal sentencing thereby reducing
sentencing disparities.202
In 2000, the Alabama Sentencing Commission was created. 20 3
According to the commission:
The history of Alabama's struggle with jail and prison overcrowding
problems and its reluctance to change unless forced to comply with
court orders, demonstrate the fact that our State's criminal justice
system is one that has evolved based on short-term political
expediency rather than one based on strategic planning with an
awareness of long-term consequences. For two decades, jails and
prison officials have been operating by crisis management, with
little or no help from other participants in the criminal justice
arena.... By establishing a permanent State Sentencing
Commission, the Alabama Legislature has recognized that our
criminal justice system deserves continuous evaluation, planning
and management from arrest, through prosecution, sentencing,
punishment and the reintegration of offenders after the completion
4
of their sentence. 20
The purpose of the commission is to "review existing sentence
structure, including laws, policies, and practices, and to determine

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

203. ALA. CODE § 12-25-1 (2007).

204. Alabama Sentencing Commission, History of the Alabama Sentencing
Commission and Timeline of Events Leading to Its Creation, Creation of the
Alabama Sentencing Commission, http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov/
history.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
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and recommend to the Legislature and Supreme Court changes
regarding the criminal code, criminal procedures, and other
aspects of sentencing policies. '20 5 The commission consists of 16
members 206 and is responsible for securing the public safety by
providing "a swift and sure response to the commission of a crime,"
establishing a sentencing system that is fair and efficient,
promoting truth in sentencing, preventing prison overcrowding,
providing judges with flexible sentencing options, and limiting the
discretion of district attorneys in determining the charge or
crime. 20 7
In 2006, the commission implemented the Initial
Voluntary Sentencing Standards to eliminate disparity in
sentencing by weighting sentencing factors evenly. 20
The
sentencing standards are "voluntary, non-appealable, historically

205. ALA. CODE § 12-25-2(a) (2007).
206. ALA. CODE § 12-25-3(a) (2007).
The commission shall consist of the following voting members:
(1) The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or at his or her designation,
a sitting or retired judge, who shall serve as chair, or at his or her
designation another member of the commission shall serve as chair.
(2) The Governor, or his or her designee.
(3) The Attorney General, or his or her designee.
(4) A district attorney appointed by the President of the Alabama
District Attorneys' Association.
(5) Two circuit judges, active or retired, appointed by the President of
the Alabama Association of Circuit Court Judges.
(6) A district judge, active or retired, appointed by the President of the
Alabama Association of District Court Judges.
(7) A victim of a violent felony or a person whose immediate family
member was a victim of a violent felony, appointed by the Governor.
(8) The Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, or his or her designee
who is a member of the House Judiciary Committee.
(9) The Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, or his or her designee
who is a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
(10) A private attorney specializing in criminal defense appointed by the
President of the Alabama Criminal Defense Lawyers' Association.
(11) A private attorney specializing in criminal law appointed by the
President of the Alabama Lawyer's Association.
(12) A county commissioner appointed by the Governor.
(13) The Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, or his or her
designee.
(14) The Chair of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Parole, or his or
her designee.
(15) A member of the academic community with a background in
criminal justice or corrections policy appointed by the Chief Justice.
Id. See also Alabama Sentencing Commission, Members of the Commission,
http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov/members.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2007) (naming the members of the commission).
207. ALA. CODE § 12-25-2(a).
208. Alabama Sentencing Commission, 2007 Report, Collaborative Success:
Alabama
Implements
Sentencing
Standards,
at
I,
http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov/Publications/ASC
2007
Final
Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
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based, time imposed sentencing recommendations developed for 26
felony offenses, representing 87% of all felony convictions imposed
in Alabama over a five year period from October 1, 1998 through
May 31, 2003."209 Also, the commission has established a felony
offender database and a simulation model to project the impact of
210
changes to sentencing laws on department of corrections.
In 1978, the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing was
created to adopt "guidelines that promote fairer and more uniform
sentencing throughout the Commonwealth" and to provide "every
judge with a common reference point for sentencing similar
offenders convicted of similar crimes." 211 The commission consists
of 11 members 21 2 and is charged with creating a "consistent and
rational statewide sentencing policy that would increase
sentencing severity for serious crimes and promote fairer and more
uniform sentencing practices." 21 3
The commission is also
responsible for establishing sentencing guidelines that "(1)
[sipecify the range of sentences applicable to crimes of a given
degree of gravity, (2) [s]pecify a range of sentences of increased
severity for defendants previously convicted of or adjudicated
delinquent for one or more misdemeanor or felony offenses
committed prior to the current offense. . . (3) [s]pecify a range of
sentences of increased severity for defendants who possessed a
deadly weapon during the commission of the current conviction
offense, [and] (4) [p]rescribe variations from the range of sentences
applicable
on
account
of
aggravating
or
mitigating
214
circumstances."
Since 1982, the Pennsylvania commission has also served as
an information clearinghouse by collecting information on actual
209. Id. at 11.
210. Id. at 9.
211. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, 2006 Annual Report, at
2, http://pcs.la.psu.edu/2006AR.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
212. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2151.2-2152 (2007).

The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing hall consist of:
(1) Two members of the House of Representatives selected by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, no more than one of whom
shall be of the same political party.
(2) Two members of the Senate of Pennsylvania selected by the
President pro tempore of the Senate, no more than one of whom shall be
of the same political party.
(3) Four judges of courts of record selected by the Chief Justice of
Pennsylvania.
(4) Three persons appointed by the Governor, who shall be, respectively:
(i) A district attorney.
(ii) A defense attorney.
(iii) Either a professor of law or a criminologist.

Id.
213. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, Mission Statement,
http://pcs.la.psu.edu/mission-statement.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
214. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154(a) (2007).
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sentences imposed and the effectiveness of sentences. 215 In 2002,
the commission implemented the Sentencing Guideline Software
(SGS Web) system, a website application that allows on-line entry
of sentencing information. 216 Replacing paper-based Guideline
Sentence Forms, SGS Web serves as the central collection and
repository of sentencing data. 21 7 As of July 2005, counties were
required to use SGS Web to submit sentencing data 218 that
includes: "offender information and court case identification;
offense of conviction; record of previous convictions; sentence
recommendations, including applicable sentencing enhancements
and/or mandatory provisions; type of disposition; and the sentence
imposed, including any reasons provided."219 Collected data is
analyzed and used to "determine compliance; to project impacts
from changes in law, policy, or practice; to assess the impact of
guidelines and mandatory sentences; to monitor sentencing
trends; and to project the impact of policy changes on prison and
jail populations." 220 In 2006, more than 134,000 offenses were
221
sentenced and reported to the commission.
Based on the collection and analysis of sentencing data, the
commission also provides research and information to the
legislature and the public. 222 In 2006, the commission received
more that 120 requests for sentencing data from state government,
researchers, and the public. 223 Some examples include: (1) cost
comparisons between incarceration and restrictive intermediate
punishment for drug and alcohol related offenses; (2) drug
violation arrests, sentences, and treatment over time; (3)
sentences imposed for firearm offenses; (4) sentences imposed for
assaults upon victims younger that age 12; (5) sentences related to
Three Strikes; (6) minimum incarceration sentence distributions;
and (7) sentences for DUI. 224 The commission also informs the
legislature as to the impact of proposed changes to sentencing
laws. 225 Like the Alabama and Kansas commissions, Pennsylvania
has used advanced technology to implement a sentencing
simulation model and a correctional population projections

215. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, Mission Statement,
supra note 214, at 33.
216. Id. at 10.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, supra note 212, at 33.
220. Id. at 10.
221. Id. at 36.
222. See id. at 18 (detailing how the commission provides information to
various people and entities).
223. Id. at 18.
224. Id. at 18.
225. Id.
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model. 226 By gathering sentencing data and using advanced
technology, the commission's "analysis of the impact of legislative
proposals is a proactive effort to assist in the creation of solid
227
policy."
C. Illinois Sentencing Law Review Commission:
Purpose,Members, and Function
Review
Commission
Law
Sentencing
An
Illinois
recommended by CLEAR would be analogous to other Illinois
sentencing
law
review commissions and other states'
commissions. 228 An Illinois sentencing commission would compile
data regarding incarceration and provide a data-driven, rational
and comprehensive approach to changing patterns and practices in
Illinois' sentencing system. Furthermore, an Illinois sentencing
commission would insulate decisions that affect one's freedoms
from immediate pressures created by a sensational crime or a
narrow, short-term agenda of a reactionary individual or group.
Members or the staff of the sentencing commission would be
respected experts in criminal law with the capacity to analyze data
and make projections on how changes to sentencing laws would
impact prison populations and budgets. Thus, a Sentencing Law
Review Commission would ensure that Illinois' sentencing system
is both consistent and rational.
The Sentencing Law Review Commission would consist of 13
members: three members appointed by the President of the
Senate, three members appointed by the Minority Leader of the
Senate, three members appointed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, three members appointed by the Minority Leader
of the House of Representatives, and one member appointed by the
Governor. These members would represent a broad cross-section
of participants in the criminal justice system. The purpose of the
Commission would be to analyze Illinois law in order to protect the
public, promote obedience to the law, prescribe sentences that are
proportional to the seriousness of the offense, "forbid and prevent
the commission of offenses .. . [and to] prevent arbitrary or
oppressive treatment of offenders, and restore offenders to useful

226. Id.
227. Id.
Guidelines
Sentencing
e.g.,
Minnesota
228. See,
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us; Missouri Sentencing Advisory
Sentencing
Kansas
http://www.mosac.mo.gov/index.htm;
Sentencing
Alabama
http://www.accesskansas.org/ksc;
(identifying these
http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov
sentencing law commissions, after which Illinois would model
law review commission)

Commission,
Commission,
Commission,
Commission,
four states'
its sentencing
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citizenship." 229 As part of the review process, the Commission
would conduct data collection on recidivism and the success of
rehabilitation-minded programs. The Commission would also
conduct an on-going study, review, and evaluation of existing
sentencing laws; as well as review and evaluate all proposed
sentencing-law legislation filed in the Illinois General Assembly.In
addition, an Illinois sentencing commission could conduct
empirically based offender risk assessments. 230
The goal of
conducting risk assessments would be "to divert low-risk offenders,
who are recommended for incarceration ...... to an alternative
'231
sanction other than prison.
By estimating an offender's likelihood of repeat criminal
behavior, a sentencing commission may classify the offender based
232
on their relative risk of such behavior.
For example, in 2002, the Virginia Criminal Sentencing
Commission implemented a non-violent offender risk assessment
instrument "to select 25% of the lowest risk, incarceration-bound,
drug and property offenders for placement in alternative (nonprison) sanctions. 233 To estimate recidivism, the commission looks
at eleven factors: (1) offender gender, (2) offender age, (3) offender
marital status, (4) offender employment status, (5) whether
offender acted alone when committing the crime, (6) whether there
were additional offenses at conviction, (7) whether the offender
had been arrested or confined within the past 12 months, (8)
offender's prior criminal record, (9) whether the offender had prior
drug felony convictions, (10) whether the offender had been
incarcerated as an adult, and (11) whether the offender had been
incarcerated as a juvenile. 234 These factors are calculated to
assess the offender's risk to public safety and to determine
whether an alternative sanction is appropriate. 235 Judges still
retain discretion on sentencing because the risk assessment
229. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-2.
230. See, e.g., Virginia Sentencing Commission, 2004 Annual Report, at 35,
http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/2004FULLAnnualReport.pdf (last visited Nov. 21,
2007).
231. Id. at 36.
232. Rick Kern, Director, Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission,
Presentation at the Vera Institute of Justice and Pew Charitable Trusts MultiState Meeting, IntegratingRisk Assessment into Sentencing Practices(Nov. 46, 2007).
233. Virginia Sentencing Commission, 2004 Annual Report, at 35
http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/2004FULLAnnualReport.pdf (last visited Nov. 21,
2007).
234. The National Center for State Courts and the Virginia Criminal
Sentencing Commission, Offender Risk Assessment in Virginia, A Three-Stage
Evaluation: Process of Sentencing Reform, Empirical Study of Diversion and
Recidivism, Benefit-Cost Analysis, at 27, http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/
risk.offrpt.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
235. Id. at 4.
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instrument provides recommendations for alternative sanction. 236
In Fiscal Year 2006, among the 6,413 non-violent risk assessment
cases received by the Virginia commission, 49% were considered
"low risk" and recommended to an alternative sanction by the nonviolent offender risk assessment. 237 As a result, judges sentenced
238
21% of offenders found as "low risk" to an alternative sanction.
Like the Virginia commission, an Illinois sentencing
commission could use a risk assessment instrument to divert drug
and alcohol involved offenders from prison sentences to
community-based treatment. 239 According to a March 2007 study
by the Vera Institute of Justice, persons admitted into Illinois
prisons for lower-level felonies are more frequently identified as
drug or alcohol involved. 240 In Fiscal Year 2006, among the 16,889
persons admitted to prison for a Class 3 or Class 4 offense, 5,254
(31.1%) were drug involved and 4,338 (25.7%) were alcohol
involved. 241
Thus, a risk assessment instrument could be
fashioned to consider drug- or alcohol-involved offenders to divert
low-risk offenders to alternative sanctions. 242 By diverting druginvolved offenders to community-based treatment, more than $19
million in costs could be avoided annually. 243 Likewise, by placing
alcohol-involved offenders into community-based treatment
244
instead of prison, more than $14 million in costs could be saved.
CONCLUSION

The CLEAR Commission proposed a Criminal Law Review
Commission and a Sentencing Law Review Commission to address
the need for a de-politicized, holistic approach to criminal and
sentencing law development.
Moreover, the criminal and
sentencing commission is based on other existing Illinois review
commissions such as the Commission on Government Forecasting
and Accountability and the Compensation Review Board. 245 In
addition to the current Illinois review commissions, the criminal
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law commission proposal is also modeled, in part, on other states
246
that have review commissions to revise substantive laws.
States such as California, Connecticut, and Oregon have created
law review commissions to ensure that their state's laws are
understandable and free of defects. 247 States such as Alabama,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, and Pennsylvania have established
effective sentencing review commissions to establish a system of
reasoned, effectual sentencing laws. 248 Perhaps Illinois should
follow suit.
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